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Book Review

Being and Owning: The Body, Bodily
Material, and the Law, by Jesse Wall1
ALICJA PUCHTA2
FOR CENTURIES, THE STARTING POINT of the common law regarding ownership

of the human body has been the no property rule—that is, the presumption that
human bodies cannot be owned.3 The rule goes back at least as far as Sir Edward
Coke’s Institutes of Laws of England of 1644, where he wrote that cadavers are
nullius in bonis: the property of no one.4 1882 marks the first recorded judgement
in English law regarding ownership of the human body. In Williams v Williams,5
the Court of Chancery held that there was no property in the dead body of a
human being. As such, one could not bequeath one’s body to another after death.
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) [Wall].
JD Candidate 2017, Osgoode Hall Law School. Many thanks to Boris Majkic for acting as
my sounding board, and Richard Haigh for his invaluable comments.
Dianne Nicol et al, “Impressions on the Body, Property and Research” in Imogen Goold et
al, eds, Persons, Parts and Property (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 9 at 13. The existence of
slavery is a notable exception to the common law rule of “no property in the human body.”
At the same time courts were enforcing the idea that one could not own his or her body
parts, they were oddly quiet with regard to ownership of living beings. This tension can be
explained through the historical treatment of slaves as chattel. Because slaves were considered
things rather than legal persons, they were characterized as objects of rights rather than
subjects of them. English law eventually abolished the notion that living persons could be
property. See Rohan Hardcastle, Law and the Human Body: Property Rights, Ownership and
Control (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 64.
E Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Law of England: Concerning High Treason,
and Order Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Classes (London: 1644) at 203; Wall,
supra note 1 at 1.
[1882] 20 Ch D 659, [1881-5] All ER Rep 840 [Williams].
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Exceptions have since been carved out of the no property rule. In the case of
Doodeward v Spence, the Australian High Court declared there was property in
the corpse of a two-headed baby the plaintiff had stored in a jar and exhibited.6
The Court made its ruling on the basis that the corpse was no longer an ordinary
corpse, having been transformed through a combination of “work and skill” into
a specimen.7 The English case of R v Kelly similarly applied the work and skill
exception to avoid the no property rule.8 In Kelly, the Royal College of Surgeons
stored body parts in jars. The defendant stole the body parts, but claimed that,
due to the no property rule, he could not be charged with theft. The court in
Kelly held that the body parts—by virtue of having been transformed through
work and skill—were property of the college, thus thwarting the defendant’s
attempts to evade criminal liability.
In Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust, the plaintiffs’ property rights to
their own sperm were recognized on the general basis that the plaintiffs had
produced the sperm and separated it from their bodies with the intention of
later using it for reproductive purposes.9 The Court of Appeal for England and
Wales concluded that a departure from the limited work and skill exception was
necessary because developments in medical science prompted “a re-analysis of the
common law’s treatment of and approach to the ownership of parts or products
of a living body.”10
These cases demonstrate courts’ increasing willingness to expand common law
principles to respond to a modern reality in which technological advancements
have made it possible to treat human-derived materials in ways that were
previously unimaginable. As technology has evolved, so too has the law, resulting
in a “postmodern rewriting (and re-righting) of the body.”11
In Being and Owning, Jesse Wall takes the reader through the above
precedents and many others. Wall does not, as one might expect, lay the cases out
in chronological order. Rather, he engages with them organically, whenever they
become thematically relevant. Each chapter opens with a compelling account
from a case dealing with legal issues around bodily material. After Wall introduces
each case, he then relies on it to bolster his claims or to demonstrate concepts in
practice. Cases are thus woven in as a seamless element of the narrative of Being
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

[1908] 6 CLR 406, [1908] HCA 45 [Doodeward].
Ibid at 414.
[1998] EWCA Crim 1578, [1998] 3 All ER 741 [Kelly].
[2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2009] 2 All ER 986 [Yearworth].
Ibid at para 45.
Peter Halewood, “On Commodification and Self-Ownership” 20:2 (2013) Yale JL &
Human 131 at 139.

Puchta, Being and Owning 301

and Owning. And although Wall purports to focus on jurisprudence from the
United Kingdom, he does not do himself justice: the book is exhaustive in its
coverage of common law jurisprudence dealing with ownership in the human
body and human tissue.
The overarching purpose of Being and Owning is to determine what the legal
status of bodily material is, and what it should be.12 Wall shapes his analysis using
three main inquiries. First, he sets out to identify under what circumstances a
person ought to be able to own bodily material, and which legal frameworks we
should utilize to assert ownership. Second, Wall points out that ownership in the
human body may be an uncomfortable notion because the body can be both a
subject (an individual who attracts moral attention), and an object. Using this
framework, he examines where on the subject-object spectrum human bodily
material should fall.13 The third inquiry proceeds on the basis that we may attribute
value to bodily material in two ways.14 Bodily material may be valued as an object
in and of itself, in which case we attribute value to it based on our individual
preferences as we do for all possessions. Alternatively, bodily material may have
value because of its unique status as a physical extension of our subjective selves.
Wall argues that we must first discern which type of valuation is being applied to
bodily material in a given instance if we intend to treat it as property.
Wall opens his book with an overview of pertinent property law concepts
by reviewing and rejecting different theories of ownership. In Chapter 1,
he explains that ownership and property are not interchangeable concepts.
Ownership is a functional concept that is often described as being made up of
accrued “incidents of ownership.”15 First popularized by Tony Honoré, incidents
of ownership are a way of subdividing the bundle of rights that attaches to any
given object.16 Incidents of ownership include the right to possess an object,
to sell it, to transfer it, to manage it, and so on. Bodily material fits well within
the ownership paradigm precisely because of how easily incidents of ownership
extend to bodily material. Subjects can have functional relationships with bodily
material that reflect enumerated incidents of ownership: we can possess, control,
or even sell sperm cells in much the same manner we can possess, control, or sell

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Wall, supra note 1 at 3.
Ibid at 3-4.
Ibid at 4.
Ibid at 12.
Tony Honoré, “Ownership” in Tony Honoré, Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and
Philosophical (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 161 at 161–92.
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a car. However, unlike cars, sperm cells—or any other bodily material for that
matter—often demand moral considerations that reflect their human origins.
Wall asserts that it is important to consider different incidents of ownership
when inquiring into the moral implications of classifying bodily materials as
property. This is because different incidents of ownership may require different
types or levels of justification.17 For example, justifying why someone should be
able to possess their sperm cells engages different considerations than justifying
why they should be able to sell their sperm cells. In Chapter 2, Wall uses the
inquiry into how we can relate the outer object of separated bodily material to
the inner subjectivity of its human source to explore justifications explaining
why incidents of ownership in bodily material should be recognized. Wall rejects
the Lockean “work and skill” justification from Doodeward, characterizing it as
incomplete.18 He argues that, although the transformation of a human subject
to an object through work and skill bridges the gap between object and subject
somewhat, it does so imperfectly, for the justification can only be made in certain
narrowly formulated circumstances. Wall contends that a Hegelian conception
can more fully bridge the gap between object and subject.19 A Hegelian basis for
ownership in human tissue is rooted in the idea that people can wilfully create
a state of affairs that results in the generation of bodily material, and that the
individual can then use that bodily material to achieve specific ends. While this
concept is difficult to follow in the abstract, Wall helpfully clarifies the nature
of a Hegelian justification by using Yearworth as an example. In Yearworth, the
plaintiffs’ property rights in their sperm were recognized because they alone had
generated the sperm so they could later use it for their own benefits.20
Ultimately, however, Wall rejects both the Lockean and Hegelian justifications
in favour of one first proposed by Maurice Merleu-Ponty: Rather than treating
the subject and the bodily tissue object as two separate things between which
we must bridge the gap, we should recognize them as overlapping, intertwined
entities.21 Objects derived from human bodies will always engage a person’s
subjectivity. The values that are attached to the object depend on whether the
17.
18.
19.
20.

Wall, supra note 1 at 31.
Ibid at 47-50.
Ibid at 50-56.
A Hegelian justification seems limited to regenerative bodily material. The concept of an
individual wilfully producing regenerative bodily material (i.e., sperm, ova, or blood) for a
specific purpose such as in vitro reproduction or blood donation is intuitive. But the notion
of generating tissue to achieve one’s ends cannot possibly apply to non-regenerative tissues,
making the justification unavailable in contexts like organ donation.
21. Wall, supra note 1 at 57-58.
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subject sees the object as one that is either in-itself or for-itself. An object that is
in-itself is essentially treated as a mere object, and has only a causal connection to
an individual subject.22 The subject may use the object in a mechanical manner,
and may ascribe value to it that is similar to the value one may ascribe to a precious
ring or a favourite shirt, but no more. In contrast, human bodily material as an
object for-itself represents a direct extension of the individual’s subjectivity, for
it is the individual’s tie to the external world through which he or she expresses
himself or herself.23 For example, we can view the sperm in Yearworth as either
mere objects, or objects for-themselves—synonymous with the patients’ bodies
and necessarily associated with them. Ultimately, Wall contends that any inquiry
into property rights in bodily material must distinguish between whether the
bodily material in question is treated as mere object or as an object for-itself.
Having established that bodily material may be considered a mere object
in some circumstances, Wall turns in Chapter 3 to the corollary of this
conceptualization: commodification. Commodification is often the central
concern raised around ownership of human bodily material. Recognizing the
proprietary nature of human tissue runs the danger of treating objects derived
from humans as desirable commodities, severable from their progenitors, and
with a value independent of said progenitors. When human body parts are dealt
with as things that can be “severed, moved around, controlled, bought and
sold, sued over and profited from,” they lose their inherent dignity as objects
derived from subjects.24 The concern with commodification is that it leads to
objectification that extends beyond the body part to its human source. In turn,
objectifying an individual undermines his or her inherent value and dignity.25 As
Wall puts it, it “denigrates” the individual, vitiating the value we see in humans
in their own right.26
The Kantian notion of value equivalence posits that objects that can be
substituted for another have an equivalent value, while those that have no
22. Ibid at 59-60.
23. Ibid at 58-59.
24. Kate Greasley, “Property Rights in the Human Body: Commodification and Objectification”
in Imogen Goold et al, eds, Persons, Parts and Property (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2014) 67 at 70.
25. See e.g. Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 2001); Margaret Jane Radin, “Market-Inalienability” (1987) 100:8 Harv L Rev 1849;
Carolyn McLeod, “For Dignity or Money: Feminists and the Commodification of Women’s
Reproductive Labour” in Bonnie Steinbock, ed, Oxford Handbook of Bioethics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007) 258 at 258-81.
26. Wall, supra note 1 at 80.
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equivalent have an inner worth, a dignity on which one cannot put a price.27 Some
scholars in the field have argued that commodification of human-derived objects
necessarily leads to objectification of an individual, leading to a world where
society regards human bodies as resources, not as objects entitled to Kantian
dignity.28 However, Wall points out that one cannot presume that what is “true of
the whole must be true of its parts.”29 Whether human body parts possess Kantian
dignity depends on the values ascribed to them by their progenitor. Do we view
the item as in-itself? Or do we view it as for-itself? Commodifying an item
that is in-itself does not invite value degeneration. Rather, denigration occurs
when one commodifies an item that is for-itself. An item that is for-itself has a
non-equivalent value; if we ascribe a monetary, equivalent value to it, we corrupt
its inherent value.30 On this basis, Wall argues that decisions with regard to the
sale of bodily material should depend on whether the progenitor of the material
views it as inherently valuable or as a mere object.31 However, the decision as to
whether an object is for- or in-itself should be insulated from financial and social
pressure. External social or financial pressure can crowd out intrinsic reasons for
not wishing to sell a part of our bodies, thus forcing value equivalence on an
object that the subject in fact intrinsically views as for-itself.32
In Chapter 4, Wall moves away from the morality-laden discussion around
commodification, and considers the practical difficulties underpinning the
ownership of human bodily materials. Specifically, he orients his discussion
towards both the structure and functionality of property law frameworks, and
whether such frameworks can be applied to human bodies.
Property law describes legal relationships between rights-holders and objects.
The use of said objects is governed in a legally distinct manner centred on the
exclusion of others from the object.33 However, the protection of bodily material
differs on a conceptual level from that of other objects, and the two should not
be conflated. Wall characterizes the rights to control and use our own bodies and
their derivatives as “non-contingent,” in that they always “protect a particular
set of preferences and choices that can only be exercised by the particular
27. Ibid at 99.
28. Stephen R Munzer, “Uneasy Case against Property Rights in Body Parts” (1994) 11 Soc Phil
& Pol’y 259 at 286; Ruth F Chadwick, “The Market for Body Parts: Kant and Duties to
Oneself ” (1989) 6:2 J Appl Philos 129 at 137.
29. Wall, supra note 1 at 100.
30. Ibid at 100-101.
31. Ibid at 101-108.
32. Ibid at 106-107.
33. Ibid at 113.
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rights-holder.”34 In other words, non-contingent rights are necessarily associated
with the identity of the rights-holder. In contrast, property rights around an object
enable contingent rights that do not depend on the identity of the rights-holder.
This attribute is reflected in the structural features of property law. For example,
under property law frameworks, it is permissible for one rights-bearer to transfer
property rights to another. Furthermore, property rights are negative rights. They
exclude others from using an object. This is in contrast to the positive duties of
care for an object that we might expect to attach to human bodies.
The distinction between non-contingent and contingent rights is an
important one because non-contingent rights protect a relationship between a
subject and a thing that has inherent value. Contingent property rights, on the
other hand, concern relationships between objects and subjects wherein the
object has value equivalence, and may be replaced with another. Therefore, Wall
argues, there is a conceptual and structural inconsistency between property rights
and rights to bodily material, which provides the “main impetus for resisting the
wholesale application of property law” to our legal treatment of bodily material.35
Chapter 5 expands upon the conclusions of Chapter 4. Wall recognizes that
the increasing tendency of the common law to recognize property rights in bodily
material stems from the pressure to exclude others from intervening with our
bodies.36 The exclusionary boundary defined by property law allows rights-holders
to prevent an open set of persons from, for example, using, possessing, and
controlling an object.37 To interfere with the owner and the object by acting in
a manner inconsistent with the owner’s instructions is impermissible. Because
such interferences are actionable wrongs, property law provides robust protection
against interferences with our bodily material. Thus, it is an attractive framework
within which to consider our rights to our bodies.
Wall concludes that the limitations of property law thus invite the
formulation of a novel legal framework to govern rights regarding bodily material.
Property law is premised on an object that is independent of the rights-holder,
whereas the relationship between human bodily material and the rights-holder
may be necessarily linked. Wall therefore argues for a dichotomous approach
that “benefit[s] from the legal structure of the exclusion strategy without having
to also apply a legal structure that presumes the entitlements in the object or

34.
35.
36.
37.

Ibid.
Ibid at 139.
Ibid at 142.
Ibid at 144.
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resource represent preferences and choices that can exist independently of the
rights-holder.”38
In the final chapter, the concepts and concerns Wall has discussed coalesce
into his conclusions as to how we should approach the use and storage of bodily
material. The way forward, he suggests, is to analogize rights in bodily material
to privacy rights.39 Wall posits that bodily material and privacy information are
parallel in that they both have values that are self-ascribed and thus ambiguous.40
Recall that bodily material may be in-itself—a mere object—or for-itself, serving
as an expression or extension of a person’s subjective self into the external world.
The classification of an item as in- or for-itself depends on which values the
progenitor ascribes to it. The value of an object of bodily material is therefore
ambiguous vis-à-vis third parties; they do not know whether an item of bodily
material is a mere object or if it has intrinsic value unless the progenitor explicitly
tells them. Personal information—information that attaches to an identifiable
person—has similar properties. Individuals often choose to tailor the information
they wish to share about themselves. An individual’s public persona thus differs
from his or her private person. In this manner, what personal information
warrants privacy protection depends on the individual that it concerns. Moreover,
the right to privacy is an exclusionary right that has been famously articulated as
“the right to be let alone.”41 It is also a non-contingent right: nothing can replace
privacy once lost. Just as the right to use, control, or store bodily material should
depend on whether said material has been self-ascribed as for-itself (rather than
in-itself ), the information that is subject to the right of privacy depends on the
individual’s self-ascription.
Ultimately, Wall suggests that two distinct legal categories should be created,
allowing different entitlements in objects that are in-themselves or for-themselves.
An in-itself object would be subject to property rights actionable against an
open set of persons. In contrast, a for-itself object would be governed by a new
regime akin to duties of confidentiality with regard to personal information, and
would only be actionable against those who knew, or ought to have known,
of the rights-holder’s relationship with the bodily tissue in question.42 This dualist
approach would provide a basis for differentiating between the possible objective
and subjective dimensions of human bodily material. Furthermore, it would
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Ibid at 143.
Ibid at 177.
Ibid at 190-91.
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” 1890 4:5 Harv L Rev 193 at 196.
Ibid at 207. [check ibid – is this still referring to Warren & Brandeis, or is it back to Wall?]
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account for the ambiguous nature of bodily material vis-à-vis third parties, for
whom it may not be clear whether an item is for-itself or in-itself.
Being and Owning presents a novel approach to considering ownership of the
human body and its derivatives. The book does a commendable job of analyzing
and explaining why some individuals view their own tissues as mere objects, and
why others view the same types of tissues as intrinsically valuable. It also captures
why we, as a society, are entirely comfortable with the notion of treating certain
bodily tissues in certain circumstances as objects, but why we feel a line must be
drawn with regard to others. Wall elucidates the basis on which this line should
be drawn. Paying attention to how an item of bodily material is self-ascribed
guides our behaviour with regard to that item, dictating whether it should be
treated as an object for-itself or in-itself.
Being and Owning is conceptually challenging. It demands a lot of its
reader. This is for two reasons. First, the book is just as multi-disciplinary as it
is multi-jurisdictional. Legal notions are explained through a heavy reliance on
abstract philosophical models. The entire undercurrent of the book addresses
the moral and societal issues surrounding the objectification of the human
body. Thus, the technical, concrete aspects of the book mix frequently with
the abstract. To maintain engagement, the reader must be open to a variety of
theoretical perspectives.
Second, the book must be considered in the aggregate. Individual chapters
discuss discrete topics, but Wall introduces concepts that subtly build on one
another. Thus, the book must be read in an active manner. Each concept should
be parsed as it is presented, and then placed mentally into the overarching scheme
of the book. To this end, Wall provides useful overviews at the beginning of each
chapter that presage more detailed discussion with a brief grounding in the topics
to come. Even more helpful are the conclusions at the end of each chapter, which
Wall uses to succinctly guide the reader through the main points of the preceding
text. This assists the reader in seeing the book as a whole, and understanding
where it has been, and where it is going next.
The main shortcoming of Being and Owning is that the book is, at times,
overly concerned with conceptual justifications, and does not give as much
thought to issues of practical application. For this reason the book proceeds
in a way that is detached from reality. For example, Wall analyzes the decision
to apply property rights to bodily material as one that occurs because of the
attraction of the exclusionary principle upon which property law is based.
However, in reality, property law has been the emergent framework through
which the law has dealt with claims in human tissue for many other reasons.
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For one, the language of property helps us describe the extent to which we have
rights (such as management, possession, transferability, and control) over our
body parts to the exclusion of others.43 Additionally, the common law has been
forced to respond to claims dealing with bodily tissue because of a technological
reality that has made such claims far more common than they were in the past.
Extant property law frameworks recognize the functional parallels between items
of bodily material and conventional property objects in that they are tangible
things that can be moved, used, stored, et cetera.44 Thus, there is an “intuitive
attraction of treating items of bodily material as items of property.”45
Furthermore, classifying an object as property is an essential element in a
number of legal claims. Certain statutory legal rights are triggered only if an item
is defined as property. Similarly, a number of common law concepts (inter vivos
gifts, constructive trusts, and the tort of conversion, to name a few) hinge on the
thing at issue being classified as property. Therefore claimants must formulate
claims in a certain way to gain access to legal remedies. Recognizing bodily material
as property has the very practical benefit of providing claimants with access to
effective legal recourse. The alternative route is less desirable, as it forecloses all
property-based remedies, thereby forcing a claimant into a position where they
may have to resort to ill-suited or incomplete legal remedies.46 Given this reality,
Wall’s suggestions to reformulate our approach to the legal treatment of bodily
material are of little help to claimants in the here and now. Nonetheless, Being
and Owning is a significant contribution to the field, because it has its eyes fixed
on improving the future, and it does so in an innovative manner.
Wall’s book is also particularly timely for Canadian readers. Four Canadian
courts have considered the question of whether tissue derived from the human
body can be considered property. In chronological order, the cases are: CC v AW,47
JCM v ANA,48 Lam v University of British Columbia,49 and Piljak Estate v
Abraham.50 Collectively, the four cases converge on one common conclusion:
in Canada, bodily materials attract property rights.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Ibid at 12. [check ibid]
Ibid at 13.
Ibid.
Imogen Goold & Muireann Quigley, “The Case for a Property Approach” in Imogen Goold
et al, eds, Persons, Parts and Property (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 231 at 244.
2005 ABQB 290, [2005] AJ No 428.
2012 BCSC 584, [2012] BCJ No 802.
2013 BCSC 2094, [2013] BCJ No, aff’d 2015 BCCA 2, [2015] BCJ No 4 [Lam].
2014 ONSC 2893, [2014] OJ No 2665 [Piljak Estate].
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Three of the cases, Lam, CC v AW, and JCM v ANA, dealt with sperm
intended for use in assisted reproduction. However, the contexts of the three cases
were vastly different: Lam was a negligence claim arising out of a commercial
contract. The claim turned on an issue of statutory interpretation. CC v AW and
JCM v ANA arose as family law cases; CC v AW dealt with the sperm as an inter
vivos gift, while JCM v ANA dealt with sperm as property for the purposes of a
spousal relationship dissolution agreement. The factual scenario of Piljak Estate is
even further removed from the preceding three cases. Piljak Estate dealt with civil
procedure rules, and asked whether a deceased patient’s stored tissue samples are
property that can be used for evidentiary purposes.
The different contexts in these four Canadian cases hint at why the inquiry
into legal rights regarding bodily material must be contextual. Different contexts
require different considerations. Certain contexts—and certain tissues—require
a heightened effort to avoid objectification of an object that is, as Wall would
put it, in-itself. For example, consider two situations: living blood donation
versus organ donation from a deceased relative. Although these two situations
both involve questions of bodily material ownership, they engage different
considerations. The former example deals with a material that is more easily
classified as a mere object (blood cells), because it is renewable and easily parted
with. The latter situation, in contrast, deals with an object that is more likely
to be ascribed intrinsic value. Describing the organ of a deceased individual as
in-itself reflects the special nature of the relationship between the object (the
organ) and the subjects dealing with it (family members and loved ones of the
deceased). Ultimately, I believe readers will benefit from Wall’s book because it
proposes how the law should approach the distinction between bodily material
that is a mere object and bodily material that has intrinsic value.

